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Abstract - Industrial radiography has its inimitable 
role in non-destructive examinations. Industrial 
radiography devices, consisting of significantly high 
activity of the radioisotopes, are operated manually by 
remotely held control unit. Malfunctioning of these 
devices may cause potential exposure to the operator 
and nearby public, and thus should be practiced under 
a systematic risk control. To ensure the radiation 
safety, proactive risk assessment should be 
implemented. Risk assessment in industrial 
radiography using the Failure Modes & Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) for the design and operation of 
industrial radiography exposure devices has been 
carried out in this study. Total 56component failure 
modes were identified and Risk Priority Numbers 
(RPNs) were assigned by the FMEA expert team, 
based on the field experience and reported failure 
data of various components. Results shows all the 
identified failure modes have RPN in the range of 04 
to 216 and most of the higher RPN are due to low 
detectability and high severity levels. Assessment 
reveals that increasing failure detectability is a 
practical and feasible approach to reduce the risk in 
most of the failure modes of industrial radiography 
devices. Actions for reducing RPN for each failure 
mode have been suggested. Feasibility of FMEA for 
risk assessment in industrial radiography has been 
established by this study. 
Keywords: FMEA, risk assessment, industrial 
radiography, potential exposure, risk priority number, 
radiation safety 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial radiography is an important non- 
destructive evaluation technique in which 
radioisotopes (generally referred as source) are used 
for imaging of weld joints and castings, for detection 
of any flaw. Devices used for industrial radiography 
operations provides shielding to the source during 
storage and therefore reduces the ionizing radiations to 
the permitted levels. Radiography device consists of 
various mechanical components, to provide the safety 
systems and source transition mechanism. 
Functionality of these components are crucial, as their 
failure may cause potential radiation exposure to 
operating team and nearby public. The dose rates that 
prevail close to a source or a device may be high 
enough to cause overexposure of extremities within   a 
matter of seconds, and can result in the loss of a limb. 
Throughout the history of industrial radiography, 
accidents with some sources have occurred that have 
resulted in injuries [1]. 
As failure of radiography device or its components 
for its intended function may cause untoward  
accidents involving high exposure  to  ionizing 
radiation, it is essential to ensure that these devices are 
equipped with the necessary safety features for 
operation. Regulatory agencies of respective country 
carryout the safety assessment of the new and existing 
models of radiography devices, based on the design 
safety requirements stipulated in the international 
[2]/national standards and operational feedback from 
the operators. Design and safety features of the 
radiography devices has changed significantly with 
time, from manually operated shutter-type devices in 
1990s to current version of remotely operated devices. 
To enhance the operational safety, several advance 
features have been added in the design like rotation of 
selector ring, colour indicator for source location etc. 
Malfunctioning of the radiography devices has 
been identified as initiating event for accidents which 
has resulted in the deterministic health effects to the 
operator and public [3].With advancement in the 
design of the exposure devices, the incidents and the 
effective dose to the operating personnel has reduced. 
Risk assessment for these devices may provide inputs 
for further advancements in the design to enhance the 
radiation safety. Application of risk assessment 
methodologies like probabilistic safety assessment and 
Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA) for risk 
assessment in non-reactor radiation/nuclear facilities 
has been emphasized and encouraged by the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection 
[4]  and International Atomic Energy Agency [5,6]. 
FMEA is a well-established and systematic 
approach to identify and understand contributing 
factors of potential failures on a process, design or 
practice. The main objective of FMEA is to identify 
potential failure modes, evaluate the causes and  
effects of different component failure modes, and 
determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance  
of failure [7].This risk assessment tool may be utilised 
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to study and prioritize the consequences and the 
frequency of occurrence of failures associated with a 
system. FMEA is used for risk assessment during 
conceptual design and during process control after 
actual development of the system, as a component of 
continuous development [8]. 
FMEA is helpful to identify failure scenarios, i.e. 
potential accident initiators. At the level of individual 
systems, FMEA may be useful in identifying failure 
contributions to be modelled in fault trees[5].This risk 
assessment methodology has been adopted for risk 
assessment in various industries like nuclear, 
automotive, aerospace, healthcare/medical industries 
etc. [9-11].However, limited work has been published 
for application of FMEA in the industrial and medical 
applications of radioactive sources. FMEA study has 
been carried out in Cuba with the objective of the 
safety evaluation of the performance of cobalt 
teletherapy by the oncological unit of Pinar del Rio 
(UOPR) in Pinar del Rio, Cuba, in a systematic, 
exhaustive and structured way[5]. Giardina et al. 
carried out risk assessment of component failure 
modes in  brachytherapy  using  FMEA [12].Scorsetti 
M. et al. conducted FMEA study in radiotherapy 
process, practices in an Italian hospital and suggested 
organizational and procedural corrective measures 
[13].Marefat et al. carried out FMEA to compare the 
reliability of industrial radiography and phased-array 
ultrasonic testing for detection and identification of 
weld defect[14]. No FMEA study could be found 
published for risk assessment associated with the 
design and operation of industrial radiography 
exposure devices. 
This study aimed to the risk assessment in 
industrial radiography, using FMEA technique to 
determine the risk priority numbers for the component 
failures of the radiography devices. Present study is 
helpful to verify the feasibility of FMEA methodology 
for risk assessment in industrial radiography, which is 
still unexplored. Results in terms of RPN identify the 
components which are riskier from the operational 
hazard point of view. Actions for improvements in the 
design and operating conditions have been suggested 
for the risk management. 
II. DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY DEVICE 
Industrial radiography device servesthree purposes 
(a) operation for radiography exposures (b) providing 
shielding during non-operation time and, (c) transport 
container for the transport of source contained in it. 
Basic design and components of all the available 
models of these devices are same, with minor 
variation in the shape of shielding material housing 
and components of the safety systems. 
The radiography device comprises of four 
detachable sub-units namely, source housing, remote 
control, guide tube(s) and source   assembly. During 
non-operation hours, source assembly rests inside 
exposure container, which provides shielding to the 
source. For radiography operations, remote control 
and guide tube(s) are connected to the exposure 
container from the rear and front end respectively. 
Remote control consists of metallic control cable 
which provides meansforconnecting the source 
assembly inside exposure container. Once control 
cable is connected with the source assembly, handle 
provided in the remote control is rotated, which in turn 
pushes the source assembly forward in the projection 
sheath attached to the front end of the exposure 
container, until source assembly reaches at the end 
point containing metallic snout (exposure head). When 
the exposure time is completed, source is retracted 
back inside the source housing by rotating the handle 
of control unit in the reverse direction. Schematic 
diagram of industrial radiography exposure device is 
shown in figure 1. 
 
Key 
1 Source Housing 
2 Radioactive Sealed Source 
3 Source Holder 
4 Remote Control 
5 Control Cable and Sheath 
6 Projection Sheath 
7 Exposure Head 
8 Reserve Sheath 
 
 
Figure 1: Industrial radiography exposure device 
(Image source:  ISO-3999; 2004) 
III. FMEA IN INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY 
Several accidents associated with industrial 
radiography have been reported worldwide due to 
human error and equipment malfunctioning [1].Even 
though operation of these devices are simple, smooth 
source transition requires functioning of various 
components of the exposure device, and consequences 
of device malfunctioning may be very severe. Safety 
interlocks and indicators provided in the device have 
important role to prevent any incident/accident. 
 
Risk assessment has been carried out using 
FMEA methodology for component failure modes of 
industrial radiography devices. One of the 
prerequisites of FMEA assessment is the constitution 
of committed team with its members having strong 
knowledge and experience of the system under study. 
FMEA team, comprising of ten members having 
experience of 10- 35 years in the respective 
professions, was constituted. 
7 
6 
2 
1 
3 
5 
8 
4 
International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) – Volume 39 Number 4- September 2016 
ISSN: 2231-5381 http://www.ijettjournal.org Page 218 
 
 
 
 
To provide appropriate weightage, members from all 
the stakeholders of radiography devices, i.e. operators, 
radiological safety officers, suppliers of devices/spare 
parts, maintenance & servicing personnel and 
radiation safety regulator, were included as member of 
the FMEA team. Before starting actual assessment, 
formal training about the FMEA methodology was 
provided to all the team members. 
 
Study was carried out at one of the servicing 
and maintenance site of radiography devices. 
Whenever required, device with dummy source 
assembly was operated to simulate the actual 
operational conditions. Basic design and safety 
components of all the industrial radiography devices 
as same, therefore study was carried out considering a 
generic model of the radiography device along with 
the consideration of special safety 
provisions/interlocks provided in all commercially 
available models of industrial radiography devices. 
For the study purpose, radiography device was divided 
into its four sub-units namely (i) source housing, (ii) 
guide tube (iii) remote control unit, and (iv) source 
assembly. Each sub-unit was further divided upto its 
basic component level. Assessment outputs were 
compiled in a table comprising of the failure modes 
and effects of these failure modes on the device and 
the operator/public. 
 
FMEA requires three numerical attributes for 
each component failure modes, (i) Occurrence of 
failure (O), which expresses the probability that the 
component failure will occur, (ii) Severity of failure 
(S), which expresses the severity of event  resulting 
due to the component failure and, (iii) detection (D) 
which represents the probability that the incipient 
failure will be detected before it occurs. Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) is obtained as product of these 
indexes. 
                              RPN= O X S X D 
 
Numerical values of these parameters i.e. O,  
S & D varies from 1 to 10, which is estimated by the 
experts of FMEA team. Final value of RPN varies 
from 1 to 1000, with higher values as more critical and 
should be given higher priorities for correction. O,S 
and D ranking were assigned using standard criteria 
published in literatures, as given in table I-III 
respectively. To determine the occurrence (O) values, 
the failure data collected by regulatory agency during 
pre-source loading inspections, failure data from the 
records of servicing and maintenance agency, and the 
field experience of FMEA team members, were 
utilized. Severity (S) ranking were assigned on the 
basis of the failure effect on the person, which is the 
main concern of risk assessment. Severity of failure on 
the person has been considered as the severity of 
exposure to ionizing radiation. Term ‘Injury’ in table 
II, corresponds to the exposure to ionizing radiation 
from radioactive source. 
TABLEI. FMEA ranking for probability of 
Occurrence (O) for component failure [12, 15-18] 
 
Probability of 
Occurrence 
Ranking Possible failure 
rate (No. of 
exposures) 
Remote 1 < 1:20,000 
Low 2 1:20,000 
3 1:10,000 
Moderate 4 1:2000 
5 1:1000 
6 1:200 
High 7 1:100 
8 1:20 
Very High 9 1:10 
10 1:2 
 
 
TABLEII. FMEA ranking for Severity (S) of 
component failure [10, 12, 19-22] 
Effect Rank Severity of effect 
No effect 1 No reason to expect 
failure. Slight annoyance- 
no injury to worker or 
public. 
Very Minor 2 Very minor effect on 
device performance. Slight 
danger- no injury to 
worker or public. 
Minor 3 Minor effect on device 
performance. No injury to 
worker or people. 
Very Low 4 Very low effect on device 
performance. Minor or no 
injury to worker. 
Low 5 Moderate effect on device 
performance. The device 
requires repair. Very 
moderate danger-minor 
injury to worker. 
Moderate 6 Device performance is 
degraded. Some safety 
functions may not operate. 
The device requires repair. 
Moderate danger- minor to 
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TABLEIII. FMEA ranking for Detection (D) of 
component failure [10, 12, 18, 22, 23] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no clear demarcation on the 
acceptable values of RPN in the literatures. Lipol et al. 
considers RPN as acceptable if less than 200, 
undesirable if between 200 and 500 and unacceptable 
if more than 500 [24]. Serafini et al. assumes RPN 
acceptable if less than 100, corrective action necessary 
if RPN between 100 and 150 and drastic and timely 
actions are necessary if RPN more than 150 [25]. For 
the present study, following conservative acceptance 
criteria for the resulted RPN was set by FMEA team, 
based on the experience and literature review. 
 
(1) Acceptable if RPN ≤ 100 
(2) Corrective actions recommended for  500 ≥ RPN 
> 100 
(3) Urgent corrective actions are recommended if 
RPN >500 
  moderate injury to worker. 
High 7 Device performance is 
severely affected but 
operational with reduced 
level of safety 
performance. Dangerous- 
moderate to major  injury 
to worker OR minor injury 
to public. 
Very High 8 Primary safety function(s) 
of device is lost. Failure 
can involve hazardous 
outcomes. Dangerous-may 
result in major injury to 
worker OR moderate 
injury to public. 
Hazardous 
with warning 
9 Failure involves hazardous 
outcomes. Very dangerous- 
may result in major injury 
or death of worker ormajor 
injury to public. 
Hazardous 
without 
warning 
10 Failure is hazardous and 
occurs without warning. It 
suspends operation of the 
system. Extremely 
dangerous- may cause 
death of worker or public. 
 
Detectability Rank Probabilit 
y of 
detection 
(%) 
Likelihood of 
detection of 
failure or error 
Almost Certain 1 86-100 Design/operation 
control will almost 
certainly detect a 
potential  failure 
mode. 
Very high 2 76-85 
High 3 66-75 High chance that the 
design/operation 
control will almost 
certainly detect a 
potential  failure 
mode. 
Moderately high 4 56-65 
Moderate 5 46-55 Moderate chance that 
the Design/operation 
control will detect a 
potential  failure 
mode (e.g. the defect 
will remain 
undetected until the 
device performance is 
affected). 
Low 6 36-45 
Very low 7 26-35 Remote chance that 
the design/operation 
control will detect a 
potential  failure 
mode (e.g. the defect 
will remain 
undetected until 
device inspection is 
carried out). 
Remote 8 16-25 
Very remote 9 6-15 Defect most likely 
remains undetected 
(e.g. the 
design/ operation 
control cannot detect 
potential cause or the 
operation will   be 
continued  to   be 
performed  in  the 
presence   of 
the defect). 
Absolute 
uncertain 
(impossible to 
detect) 
10 0-5 Device/component 
failures are not detect 
(e.g. there  is   no 
design/operation 
verification or  the 
operation   will 
certainly be 
continued to perform 
in the presence of the 
defect) 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
Risk assessment for the industrial radiography 
exposure device was carried out by dividing the whole 
device into its four sub-units. Each sub-unit was 
further divided up to component level and failure 
mode of each component was discussed in detail. 
RPNs were calculated for all the identified failure 
modes of each sub-unit of industrial radiography 
exposure device. 
 
Total 56 failure modes were identified & 
assessed, and corresponding rankings  were 
assigned.25 failure modes which are considered 
important and severe, are given in table IV. Resulted 
RPN for failure modes varies from 04 to 216.The 
highest RPN obtained from the study which is 216,is 
much lower than the maximum possible value of RPN 
i.e. 1000, which reflect that very severe failure modes 
in the existing design of industrial radiography devices 
are unusual. 
 
Occurrence ranking of most of the failure modes 
are on lower side only. However, the lower 
detectability and higher severity contributes to  
increase in RPN values. Reducing severity of the 
failure modes (which is the exposure to the ionizing 
radiation), is mainly dependent on the human actions, 
therefore to reduce the RPN of severe failures, easiest 
and practical way would be to increase the detection 
probability. FMEA team recommended the actions to 
reduce RPN for each of the failure modes, which are 
outlined in table IV. These recommended action(s) 
focuses mostly to increase the detection probability. 
Severity ranking of failure modes are provided in the 
last column of the table IV. In case of same RPN 
values, failure mode having higher severity ranking 
has been assigned higher RPN ranking. 
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Table IV. FMEA of component failure modes in industrial radiography 
 
 
ID 
 
Component 
 
Potential Failure 
Mode 
 
Potential failure effect on 
radiography device 
Failure effect on person 
(Occupational 
worker/Public) 
 
Potential cause(s) of 
failure 
Detection 
method (if 
any) 
 
O 
 
S 
 
D 
 
RPN 
(O*S*D) 
 
Actions 
Recommended 
Ranki 
ng 
Remote Control/  Driving Assembly  
 
RC1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control cable 
 
Wire damaged/ 
broken 
 
Source cannot be 
projected/retrieved 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
 
Wear and tear 
Inspection 
(partial wire 
length only) 
 
3 
 
8 
 
8 
 
192 
 
Periodic QA testing 
2 
 
 
RC2 
 
Male coupler 
dimensions worn 
out 
 
Source detachment from 
control cable/cannot be 
retrieve back in the device 
Potential exposure to 
occupational 
worker/public 
 
 
Wear and tear 
 
 
Inspection 
 
 
2 
 
 
9 
 
 
3 
 
 
54 
 
 
Periodic QA testing 
10 
 
 
RC3 
 
Male coupler 
crimping with 
wire is damaged 
 
Source detachment from 
control cable/cannot be 
retrieve back in the device 
Potential exposure to 
occupational 
worker/public 
 
Excessive force at 
crimping/wear and 
tear 
 
 
inspection 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
3 
 
 
27 
 
 
Periodic QA testing 
14 
 
RC4 
 
Rotating handle 
 
Damaged 
Source cannot be projected. 
Source may be retracted 
with difficulty 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
(if source is in 
exposed position) 
 
Accidental 
impact/fall 
 
Physical 
verification 
 
2 
 
5 
 
3 
 
30 
Periodic QA testing 13 
 
RC5 
 
Projection 
sheath/ conduit 
 
Damaged (from 
inside) 
 
Excessive resistance is 
required for source  
assembly movement 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
(if source is in 
exposed position) 
Fall of heavy 
object/crushing/kink 
ing/wear & tear 
 
 
No method 
 
 
3 
 
 
5 
 
 
9 
 
 
135 
Method need to be 
developed for 
inspection 
05 
Guide Tube 
 
GT1 
 
 
Projection 
sheath 
 
Damaged (from 
inside) 
 
Source stuck inside guide 
tube 
 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
Fall of heavy 
object/crushing/kink 
ing/wear and tear 
 
No method 
 
3 
 
8 
 
9 
 
 
216 
Method need to be 
developed for 
inspection 
01 
 
GT2 
Damaged (from 
outside) 
 
No effect on the operation 
 
NAE 
Fall of heavy 
object/crushing/ 
ageing 
Physical 
verification 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
24 
 
Periodic QA testing 
15 
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GT3 
  
Flexibility lost 
 
Source stuck inside guide 
tube 
 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
Prolonged exposure 
to harsh 
environmental 
conditions/ageing 
 
Inspection 
 
4 
 
6 
 
5 
 
120 
 
Periodic QA testing 
06 
 
GT4 
End tip of guide 
tube (exposure 
head) 
 
Damaged/decoupl 
ed from sheath 
 
Source may move out of the 
projection sheath 
Potential exposure to 
occupational 
worker/public 
Fall of heavy 
object/crushing/wea 
r and tear 
 
Inspection 
 
2 
 
9 
 
2 
 
36 
 
Periodic QA testing 
11 
Source Assembly 
 
 
SA1 
 
 
Female coupler 
 
Crimping with 
wire is damaged 
 
Female coupler part 
disconnected with wire. 
Source may be detached 
 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
 
Poor crimping/wear 
& tear 
 
 
Inspection 
 
 
2 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
144 
 
Stringent QC testing 
by manufacturer 
04 
 
 
SA2 
 
 
 
 
Source capsule 
 
 
Damaged 
 
 
Source pellets dispersion 
Potential exposure to 
occupational worker 
& public (if failure 
occurs during source 
exposed condition) 
 
Compromised 
material quality/ 
Wear & tear 
 
Leak  test 
(not available 
with user ) 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
10 
 
 
90 
 
Material control and 
stringent QC testing 
by manufacturer 
07 
 
 
SA3 
 
Crimping with 
wire is damaged 
Source capsule may 
disconnected with wire. 
Source detached from 
assembly 
 
Potential exposure to 
occupational 
worker/public 
 
Poor crimping /wear 
and tear 
 
Cannot be 
detected with 
active source 
 
 
2 
 
 
9 
 
 
10 
 
 
180 
 
Stringent QC testing 
by manufacturer 
03 
 
Source Housing 
 
 
SH1 
 
Pop up 
button/switch/ 
safety latch 
 
Broken 
 
Device Inoperable 
 
NAE 
Improper handling/ 
fall from height/ 
impact with other 
heavy object 
 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
9 
 
Training to the 
operator 
20 
SH2 Blocked/jammed Device inoperable NAE 
No periodic 
maintenance 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
6 3 1 18 
Periodic servicing 
& maintenance 
17 
SH3 
 
 
Selector ring 
Blocked/jammed 
Source cannot be driven 
out 
NAE 
No periodic 
maintenance 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
3 3 7 63 
Periodic servicing 
& maintenance 
09 
 
SH4 
Not rotating after 
control cable 
connection 
 
Source cannot be driven 
out/device cannot be locked 
 
NAE 
Mishandling of the 
device/ impact with 
other heavy object 
 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
Training for 
operation/ carefully 
handling of the 
device 
23 
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SH5 
Source 
position 
indicator 
(colour 
indicator) 
 
Broken/jammed/ 
damaged 
 
Source location cannot be 
determined 
 
Potential exposure to 
operator 
Improper handling/ 
fall from height/ 
impact with other 
heavy object 
 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
 
1 
 
6 
 
1 
 
6 
Training for 
operation/ carefully 
handling of the 
device 
22 
SH6 
Colour(s) not 
visible 
Source location cannot be 
determined 
Potential exposure to 
operator 
Wear & tear 
Physical 
verification 
3 6 1 18 
Periodic servicing 
& maintenance 
16 
 
SH7 
 
Device lock 
 
Broken/jammed/ 
damaged 
 
Device inoperable 
 
NAE 
Accidental fall of 
the device/impact 
with heavy object 
 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
18 
Carefully handling 
during operation/ 
transport 
17 
 
SH8 
 
 
Shipping plug 
 
Threads worn out 
 
Device cannot be plugged 
from front end 
Undesired exposure to 
operator from 
streaming radiations 
 
Wear & tear 
 
Inspection 
 
3 
 
4 
 
1 
 
12 
 
Periodic QA testing 
18 
 
SH9 
 
Cable damaged 
Source positioning inside 
device may be marginally 
deviated 
 
NAE 
 
Wear & tear 
 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
 
1 
 
1 
 
7 
 
7 
 
Periodic QA testing 
21 
 
SH10 
Safety 
Plug(storage 
cover) 
Missing/Threads 
worn out/ damaged 
Device cannot be plugged 
from rear end 
 
NAE 
Wear & tear/impact 
with other object 
Inspection/durin 
g operation 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Periodic QA testing 
24 
 
 
SH11 
 
 
 
Shielding 
structure 
 
 
Damaged (visible) 
 
 
Streaming of radiation 
 
Potential exposure to 
occupational 
worker/public 
Accidental fall/large 
impact with heavy 
object/crushing of 
the device 
Visual 
inspection/ 
radiation survey 
of the device 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
Carefully handling 
during 
operation/transport 
19 
 
 
SH12 
 
Damaged 
(invisible) 
 
 
Streaming of radiation 
 
Potential exposure to 
occupational 
worker/public 
Accidental fall/large 
impact with heavy 
object/crushing of 
the device 
 
Radiation 
Survey of the 
device 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
7 
 
 
63 
 
Carefully handling 
during operation/ 
transport 
08 
 
SH13 
 
S-tube/source 
tube 
 
Damaged 
Unsmooth source 
movement in the 
device/Source stuck inside 
device 
 
NAE 
 
Wear and tear 
 
No method 
 
1 
 
4 
 
9 
 
36 
Method need to be 
developed for 
inspection 
12 
NAE= No Adverse Effect 
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Radioisotopes like Co-60, Ir-192 and Se-75 of 
activity range from 370 GBq to 5 TBq are used for 
industrial radiography applications. These isotopes are 
housed inside industrial radiography exposure device 
which provides shielding for ionizing radiation from 
the source. For radiography operations, these devices 
are manually operated by remote control unit. An 
accident due to equipment malfunctioning of these 
exposure devices may result in deterministic 
biological effects to the affected occupational worker 
and public. Design of these devices has improved with 
time, to improve the operational safety and to reduce 
the probability of accidents. 
 
Risk assessment for the design of industrial 
radiography devices was carried out using FMEA 
methodology. The feasibility of FMEA methodology 
for risk assessment in the industrial radiography has 
been established by this study. Results are helpful to 
learn about necessary improvements required in 
current design of the exposure device for risk 
management. Results shows that the RPN for most of 
the component failure modes are well within 
acceptable limits considering the acceptance criteria 
set for the study. None of the RPN is found to be 
above 500, where urgent corrective actions are 
required. RPNs of 19 component failure modes are 
found to be less than 100 which falls in acceptable 
category. RPN of remaining 6 component failure 
modes were assessed in the range of 100 to 500, where 
corrective actions are recommended. 
 
Out of above6 failure modes, most serious 
failure is the damage of projection sheath from inside, 
which may result in source stuck and hence excessive 
exposure to occupational worker. High RPN for this 
failure is attributed due to high severity and lower 
detection probability. Fifth severe most failure is also 
of same nature which is due to damage of projection 
sheath of remote control unit. Technique to examine 
the inner condition of projection sheath is not 
available to user as well as servicing and maintenance 
agency. Further, it has been observed that these 
projection sheaths are generally continued in use, 
beyond their useful life, until some difficulty arises in 
the smooth operation of the devices. It is highly 
recommended to develop the technique(s) for periodic 
examination for the inner condition of the projection 
sheaths. This technique should be preferably available 
with user. Additionally, regulators may enforce a 
practice for coding (e.g. colour code, engraved 
marking etc.) of each projection sheath to ensure that 
these sheaths are not used beyond their useful life, 
when the probability of failure increases manifold. 
These suggested actions may reduce the RPN of 
severity rankings 1,5 &6 of table IV. 
 
Control cable damage of remote control unit 
is    another    identified    serious    failure    mode   of 
radiography device. Detection of this failure mode is 
possible by physical inspection, but limited to the 
partial length of wire, which can be projection outside 
the sheath. Inspection of full wire length is possible by 
the servicing and maintenance agency. Therefore 
periodic inspection of control cable by the servicing 
and maintenance agency will be helpful in reducing its 
RPN.Appropriate inspection frequency may be set for 
this inspection. RPN severity rank 3 & 4 are 
associated with the damage of the crimping part of the 
source capsule and female coupler of source assembly 
respectively. Detection probability for these failure 
modes is very low, since it is not possible to inspect 
the crimping part with the active source in source 
assembly. It is recommended to frame and implement 
the policy to test the crimping part, using appropriate 
testing procedures of each inactive source assembly, 
before actual source loading. This can be adopted as 
part of quality control procedure at the manufacturer 
site or by the agency involved in source loading in the 
source assembly. 
 
Most of the other failure modes can be 
addressed by adopting the stringent and mandatory 
periodic QA test procedures by the operating 
institutions and training to the operators. 
Recommended actions may be implemented in some  
of the selected industrial radiography institutions and 
this study may be repeated after specific period to 
analyze the effectiveness of recommendations to 
reduce the RPN. 
 
Traditional FMEA technique has several 
reported drawbacks. However, FMEA is simple and 
economical method of assessment which represent 
useful tool to identify the areas for improvement in the 
design. Results of this study provides a broad picture 
of risk assessment for the design of industrial 
radiography devices. Further risk assessment studies 
utilizing alternative methods are recommended for 
industrial radiography devices and results may be 
compared. Identification of initiating events for 
accident progression have been always crucial task for 
risk assessment studies. Important and severe failure 
modes identified in this study can be utilized as 
initiating events for scenario development, to carry out 
further risk assessment studies using fault tree and 
event tree analysis. 
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